API RP 92U:2008(2013) pdf download

API RP 92U:2008(2013) pdf download.Underbalanced Drilling Operations.
— With proper selection of the packer element compound and proper installation of the RCD. Increased wear due to the use 04 a kelly and/or leaking between the kelly and the RCD should not be an issue.
— Most kellys have sharp edges and tractor marks, which can negatively impact the life of the RCD packer element. These are a result 01 the manufacturing process. The manufacturer or a machine shop should machine these off (smoothed).
4.3.3 In many areas, threaded connections are the norm on the stanipe and the kelly hose connections are hammer union type connections, these shall conform to applicable regulatory requirements. However, in the absence of applicable regulatory requirements.
4.3.3.1 Flanged standpipe and or kelly hose connections rather than hammer union connections shall be used on offshore operations.
4.3.3.2 If continuous gas injection via the standpipe Is required, kelly hose with Integral flanged end connections or integral hammer unions should be considered
4.4 Safety Studies and Reviews
4.4.1 Hazard Identification
After the deosion is made to proceed with a UBO Project, but pnor to commencement of detail design work, a HAZID review should be conducted. Primary benefit of HAZID is that early identification and assessment of the critical HSE hazards provides essential input to protect decisions.
4.4.1.1 Purpose
The purpose is to recognize the importance of HSE considerations on the fundamental, often non-HSE-relaled,
decisions that are usually made at the beginning of a project. It allows:
a) consideration of HSE Implications of alternative designs;
b) changes to philosophy/design before significant financial commitments are made:
c) identification of specific hazards and threats within the project life-cycle phase;
d) preparation of an inventory of project-specific HSE hazards and threats;
e) focus of the design effort on elSE risk mitigation. as well as compliance with operating company and regulatory requirements.
4.4.2 Safety and Operability Review (HAZOP)
HAZOP Is a structured hazard identification technique using a multi-disciplined team. It has become accepted as the main technique to identify the process hazards associated ii the design and operation of UBD circailating systems. HAZOPs have been used extensively on many UBD projects; specifically aimed at the design and operation of, but not limited to, the following:
— the surface separation system;
— the fluid system lncludrng mud pumps n’wst pumps, transfer pumps, etc.;
— the BOP system;
— completion equipment induding downhole Isolation (barriers).
4.4.2.1 Timing
After the detailed design for the UBO project Is completed but prior to commencement of operations, a detailed RAZOP review should be conducted.
4.4.2.2 Purpose
The purpose is toIIy review the proposed plan to identify and correct, or develop contingency plans for, potential problems. Although this document addresses general situations, each project is unique and should be reviewed in detail.
The review also provides a secondary function as a trning tool for personnel (including field personnel) involved in the project.
4.4.2.3 Participants (the “team) should include:
— technical staff who selected and designed the process equipment and prepared the operations program:
— site supervisors, operator, contractors (including subcontractors):
— senior operations personnel responsible for the operation:
— a competent 1-IAZID/HAZOP fadlitator
4.4.2.4 Reference documents should include the drilling program, equipment specifications and layout. P810 and/or PFD. procedures, practices as outlined in 4.5 of this document, and other industry guidelines.
4.4.2.5 The team should conduct en orderly, systematic review of the project plan to assess and identify possible failure scenarios and appropriate mitigation measures. If not already Included in the protect plan, the plan shall be modified to include appropriate mitigation controls.
4.42.6 The team should also conduct a detailed documented review of the operations program, which should be approved/signed by the senior operations person (i.e. superintendent, operations manager) responsible for it’s execution.
4,4.2.7 All action items identified and documented shall be tracked and closed out prior to start of operations.
4.4.2.8 lithe operator has conducted a 1-IAZOP review for a previous but similar UBO project, the review may be referenced and used as the basis for the new project, (except for critical sour wells). However, the validity of the HAZOP should be reviewed.